In late 2010, the European Union presented to Ukraine the Action Plan on Visa Liberalization (VLAP), which set explicit benchmarks of relevant political development to be met. If completed, the EU would open its doors to visa-free short-term travel from Ukraine. On 20 April 2016, the European Commission recommended to the European Council and the European Parliament that visa requirements for citizens of Ukraine traveling to the Schengen Area be lifted, and we are now only a few months away from the EU’s promise being fulfilled.

But despite the latest progress report on VLAP implementation concluding that Ukraine has met all the criteria required for visa liberalization, there are still some reservations about opening the Schengen Area to visa-free travel from Ukraine. Lifting the current restrictions requires approval from all members of the Schengen protocol, and several EU member states remain unconvinced that Ukrainian reforms have been sufficient.

Bearing in mind the state of Ukraine’s domestic reforms and the crisis with Russia in the east, now is an appropriate time to consider: What should the EU’s migration policy with Ukraine look like? The answer to this question has implications for the EU’s foreign policy goals in Ukraine, and implications that extend beyond Ukraine to the other Eastern Partnership countries seeking visa liberalization with Europe.

Current State of Migration

Following Ukraine’s independence, the majority of emigration was due to ethnic repatriation. Since the mid-1990s, however, emigration has been driven predominantly by economic determinants as poorer households cope with low wages or the inability to find work. Survey data shows 1.2 million Ukrainians worked abroad between January 2010 and June 2012. Eighty percent of these migrants are split roughly evenly between Russia and the EU, with Poland and the Czech Republic being the most common EU destinations due to cultural proximity. Estimates from 2014 find there are 1.1 million Ukrainians living in the EU.¹ In the past five years, the proportion of Ukrainian migration to Russia has decreased slowly. Poland has become an increasingly attractive destination due to its long-term growth and simplified access to the labor market. Ukrainians who wish to find a temporary job in Poland are not required to obtain a work permit.²

As political crisis and the conflict with Russia began in early 2014, there were expectations of an increase of Ukrainians seeking asylum in Europe. There is little history of political emigration from Ukraine and, indeed, early evidence suggested that Ukrainians escaping the affected areas of the country migrated only within the country.³ Prior to the conflict, Ukrainians had submitted practically zero applications for refugee status in Europe, but as war dragged on and more than 2 million individuals fled their homes, 14,000 Ukrainians applied for refugee status in the EU in 2014, and temporary migration to Poland increased. At the end of 2013, 37,000 Ukrainian citizens held residence cards in Poland; by October 2015 this number was 52,000.⁴ Despite this increase in temporary migration to Poland in particular, experts do not expect that migration flows to the EU will spike following visa-liberalization.⁵

Europe’s Plan for Action

Discussions between EU and Ukrainian officials regarding visa liberalization began in October 2008 and resulted in a presentation of the VLAP to Ukraine in 2010. The VLAP sets precise goals for legislative reform on four blocks of issues relevant to migration: 1) document security, 2) integrated border management, migration management, and asylum, 3) public order and security, and 4) external relations and fundamental rights. The VLAP process takes place in two phases, the first facilitating the adoption of the appropriate legislative and institutional framework, and the second monitoring its implementation. The European Commission has conducted and published regular progress reports, the first four [1, 2, 3, 4] evaluating the first phase, and the following two [5, 6] evaluating the second.

The most salient stipulation of Block 1 is the adoption of biometric passports compliant with the highest standards of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). Framework law was passed in late 2012 to establish the types of data to be collected, rules of passport issuance, and roll-out schedule. While the ICAO standards include fingerprints as a biometric feature to be used for identification, the law originally only referred to fingerprints as optional and no explicit indication was given as to which fingers’ prints were to be collected. This was corrected in the middle of 2014. This first block also called for the establishment of training programs and anticorruption procedures for authorities dealing with passports. Officials employed by the State Migration Service (SMS), the body responsible for issuing passports, have received instruction in corruption awareness and possible penalties since 2013. In the beginning of 2016, Ukraine began issuing ICAO-compliant passports and ID cards.

The second block calls for reform regarding border and migration management, and asylum policy. Ukraine began demarcating borders with Russia in 2012. Though these efforts have been stifled by the military conflict, by 2014 Ukraine had completed demarcation of its borders with Belarus and Moldova. VLAP progress reports recognized that the State Border Guard Service had made progress in becoming a modern law-enforcement agency. The penultimate report made note of difficulty in the implementation of interagency coöperation and in the management of the eastern borders. Regarding migration management, Ukraine signed readmission agreements with 17 countries by 2014. Inland detection of irregular migrants was originally considered to be insufficient due to an understaffed SMS, according to the European Commission, but in January 2016, five hundred staff were added and capacity to detect these migrants has since improved. Ukraine has implemented a ‘refugee’ subsystem of the foreigners’ database and adopted and successfully implemented legislation granting rights to asylum seekers that are more on par with those of Western Europe. The final progress report, on which the recommendation for lifting of visa requirements was made, still reported an ongoing illegal practice of detaining certain categories of asylum seekers.

Block 3 of the VLAP was targeted at preventing and fighting organized crime, terrorism, and corruption. Amendments were made to the criminal code in 2012 to combat organized crime. Legislation specifically addressing human trafficking was also passed. Per the Commission’s recommendation, Security Service pretrial investigative powers have been curbed and authorities have taken steps to ensure effective witness protection. Specialization of judges for organized crime cases has not yet take place. Legislation was adopted in 2014 to enhance the state’s ability to detect money laundering and financing of terrorism. The majority of this responsibility is in the hands of the Financial Intelligence Unit. New regulations were successful in forcing all but three of the country’s commercial banks to disclose their ownership. The National Bank of Ukraine has also begun investigating online transactions. The biggest step taken toward fighting corruption was the creation of the Anticorruption Bureau. A specialized prosecution office for cases of corruption was also established. The final progress report from the Commission warns that ensuring independence of new anticorruption bodies may be a concern.

Block 4 sets domestic civil rights goals for Ukraine. Ukrainian authorities have shown gradual improvement in ensuring the freedom of movement within Ukraine. HIV/AIDS-positive persons are no longer refused migration permits and the process for moving to or from territories not under Ukrainian control has been simplified. Travel documents are now effectively accessible to all citizens. Antidiscrimination authorities have been established and work closely with nongovernmental actors to ensure the implementation of relevant legislation. Law enforcement officials and judges were given antidiscrimination training. Amendments to the labor code regarding discrimination based on sexual orientation have been introduced. There is, though, room for clarification on such laws.

Based on these criteria and the assessment of the Ukrainian government’s adherence in both adoption and implementation, the European Commission has made the recommendation that visa requirements be lifted, allowing Ukrainian citizens possessing a biometric passport to enter the Schengen Area visa-free for visits of up to 90 days. But has Ukraine’s progress been enough? And is the European Union ready to open its doors to a country of 45 million?

Concerns About Preparedness

Despite the Commission’s assessment that Ukraine and her citizens are ready for visa-free travel to the Schengen Area, some European officials disagree with the timing. Fears about the Syrian refugee crisis have also threatened to freeze visa discussions in place. There has even been alarmism about a coming end of Schengen following the temporary introduction of internal border controls by seven member states. But these controls were introduced only at small portions of national borders and in accordance with the Schengen Borders Code.⁶ Support for free movement within Europe is still strong, especially among members of the Visegrád Group—Schengen is here to stay.  Member states have also expressed concern that not enough has been done to address the problem of corruption in Ukraine.

Moldova was also presented with a VLAP tailored specifically to its situation in 2010, and was granted visa-free travel to the EU in April of 2014. Two years later, the Moldovan experience can now be of use in understanding broadly what visa-free travel would mean for Ukraine and for the EU. While the implementation of reforms has not been without complication, the visa-free régime has so far provided for cautious optimism regarding the free movement of Ukrainian citizens in the Schengen Area.

Following what some considered a premature visa liberalization with the Western Balkans, European officials have been cautious to avoid the massive subsequent influx of asylum applications that occurred in Serbia. While the number of asylum applications filed by Moldovans increased by 58 percent following visa liberalization, in absolute numbers this translates to only 166 more applicants, not even enough to fill a commercial airliner. Additionally, the data show no increase in irregular migration as compared to the previous three years. The number of refusals of entry to the Schengen Area has increased, but this is due to some travelers misunderstanding that visa-free travel is only available to those possessing biometric passports.⁷

Moldova’s implementation of the reforms required by their VLAP has not been immediately successful. Many Moldovan politicians are involved in corrupt practices, and laws designed to combat corruption still do not function as the EU has intended. Their implementation suffers from independency problems, a lack of funding, and an unwillingness to address corruption at higher levels of governance. The VLAP also required passing and implementing antidiscrimination legislation. While the former did occur after four years of political fighting, the latter is still impotent as many of the responsible agency’s decisions are cancelled by the courts. Despite Moldova’s incomplete achievement of the EU’s goals, European diplomats have expressed their satisfaction with the outcome of visa liberalization with Moldova up to this point.⁸

With these concerns and the experiences of previous visa liberalizations in mind, the European Parliament devised and adopted instruments that give the EU greater discretion and conditionalizes the migration régimes with third countries. The first of these allows the European Parliament and the Council, following the Commission’s recommendation for liberalization, to make the final decision based on both the technical criteria contained in the VLAP and the general political relations with the country in question.⁹ The second was a visa waiver suspension—or “snapback”—mechanism, which would allow the Commission to restore visa requirements for citizens of a specific third country for a period of up to six months if a member state gave notification of a security threat presented by immigration.

An Institutional Critique

The EU’s success in spurring the appropriate reforms in Ukraine should be examined with an understanding of how new institutions take hold. Criticism has been made that the means undertaken by the EU to promote institutional change as a part of the VLAP have been the same means developed for brining about such change in the EU’s Western core countries, but that this approach is inappropriate for the countries of the Eastern Partnership, which lack the inclusive institutions and strong non-state actors found in the West.

Exporting sustainable institutions requires a functional approach that aims at performance, rather than a normative approach that prioritizes the implementation of precise rules. The functional approach leaves domestic actors to design specific rules which compete and negotiate for a best solution, while the normative approach selects rules, goals, and actors to enact them, and monitors implementation. The normative approach also tends to focus on elites rather than other social actors, but institutional change requires legitimization across society as a whole.¹⁰ Institutions are most robust, resilient, and sustainable not when they imitate or follow precise rules, but when they are flexible and polycentric. Development is a process which must involve flexibility, local knowledge, and social learning.¹¹

VLAP implementation has been rigid and top-down in structure. Despite declarations of joint-decision-making, the process is controlled and enforced by the EU. Rules and policies to be adopted are decided by the EU, neatly divided into four blocks, and to be fulfilled in two distinct stages. Monitoring is dyadic and overwhelmingly intergovernmental. Assistance focuses heavily on incumbent elites as opposed to involving a variety of actors and creating a multiplex structure of engagement. Monitoring and assistance rely fully on EU rules and norms and local non-state stakeholders are largely excluded from participatory channels.¹² The EU’s normative approach to VLAP has led to formal rule adoption, but it has yet to be demonstrated that the implementation is sustainable.

This can be contrasted with EU’s promotion of institutional change in Ukraine’s protection of the environment. The EU’s approach here was less rigid; the EU provided a blueprint for reform while allowing domestic input on the process and allowed joint-decision-making. Non-state actors played a significant role in the development and implementation of the new rules. As a result, notable progress has been made in environmental protection and dovetailing environmental legislation with EU norms.¹³ If the VLAP is to be a long-term success, where the EU’s goals are consistently met and new institutions are not considered expendable in times of turmoil, it must be built on solid foundation.

Institutions and Foundations

Institutions tend to have path dependence, and supplanting them requires more than just legislation and enforcement. Understanding what causes an institution to stick or to crumble is essential to transporting good institutions.

Institutions have their foundation in the practice, customs, and values of a population. Sustainable institutions are grounded in the indigenous population’s mētis, a term Boettke, Coyne & Leeson use to refer to local knowledge resulting from personal experience. Mētis is the glue that causes institutions to stick. The more closely an institution dovetails with the mētis of a population, the more likely that institution is to sustain and produce the intended outcome.

Indigenously introduced endogenous (IEN) institutions, those that originate spontaneously within a society as a result of individual action, are always in harmony with the population’s mētis because they both shaped by the same conditions and experiences. Indigenously introduced exogenous (IEX) institutions, such as a national government’s internal policies, and foreign-introduced exogenous (FEX) institutions, like those associated with international development policy, are less likely to be intimately connected to mētis. FEX institutions, owe their creation to some formal authority rather than a spontaneous development. In addition to this, FEX institutions are designed by people who are considerably distant—both physically and socially—from the indigenous population. As a result, such institutions are unlikely to mesh with the mētis of local actors, thus unlikely to stick. IEX institutions, too, owe their creation to a formal authority, and for this reason do not have as strong of a connection to mētis as IEN institutions. But because this authority is part of the indigenous population, it is likely to have familiarity with local practices and customs and will be capable of construct institutions that are in some ways consistent with the peculiarities of local behavior and attitudes.¹⁴

In order for an IEX or FEX institution to sustain and achieve the desired results, it must ultimately trace back to some IEN institution familiar to the local population. For the EU to achieve the desired results of institutional reform, the new institutions must be grounded in the mētis of the target country. Boettke, Coyne & Leeson cite two relevant examples: the post-Soviet transitions of Poland and Russia. During the communist period, a small number of private firms had been allowed to operate in Poland. This shaped the local mētis in a way that provided a degree of familiarity with private businesses interaction and allowed for a smooth transition to a market economy. In the Soviet Union, no such familiarity existed because no such private enterprise had existed. And so when the Soviet Union’s successor state hastily privatized state enterprises, the institution of private property failed to stick the way it did in Poland.¹⁵

When considering promotion of institutional change, Ukraine (or any target country) must not be viewed as a blank slate. New institutions must mesh with the mētis of and be legitimized by the populace if they are to be sustained. Any external introductions of institutions that are not rooted in the unique experiences, preferences, and customs of Ukraine’s inhabitants are unlikely to take hold and function as intended.

But mētis is not set in stone. As mentioned before, it is shaped by practical experience, and new experiences will contribute to the formation of a new mētis. Empirical research suggests that emigration can mold political attitudes to more resemble those of the receiving country, and that this change in attitudes has real effects upon the institutions back home.

Until the end of the last decade, Moldova was dominated by the Communist Party. In 1998, Moldova experienced an explosion in emigration—both eastward and westward—in response to the Russian financial crisis. By 2009, more than one in every twelve Moldovans had left the country. In the 2009 and 2010 elections the Communists lost their majority in the parliament. A difference-in-difference test found that the prevalence of emigration to the West within a community was strongly correlated with a decrease in the share of Communist votes in a community. Qualitative interviews with Moldovans living in the West revealed that they shared information about how democracy and other institutions in Western Europe function with their families who did not migrate. Some interviewees mentioned that their time abroad had made them less likely to tolerate corruption and that they explicitly advised their family members not to accept bribes from Communist campaigners.¹⁶

Survey data from Cape Verde reveals that emigration (return migrants especially) increases the demand for political accountability.¹⁷ This coincides with related research that finds a connection between a state’s openness to emigration and its institutional quality. Using data for a multitude of developing countries, higher overall rates of emigration are found to contribute to higher scores on standard indicators of de facto political and economic institutional quality. This appears to be driven entirely by emigration to highly developed, highly democratic countries.¹⁸ Evidence is suggestive of a mechanism by which emigrants diffuse Western values and experiences to their home countries, even when they do not return to these countries. It is possible, even within only a number of years, for emigrants to substantially influence and reshape the foundations on which their home countries’ institutions rest. It is clear that “mētis is not a static concept”.¹⁹ It is not something external authorities can alter at will, but it is malleable.

With these findings in mind, European officials might consider that the best way to encourage institutional development in Ukraine is for visa liberalization to proceed it. As the Ukrainian mētis transforms, familiarity with and demand for liberal democratic institutions and their outcomes will grow. Institutions will be introduced indigenously, by people with integral local knowledge, with goals in mind similar to those that Europe has set for its Eastern partners. Such an approach spreads power among a greater number of relevant stakeholders to avoid some of the resilience and efficacy problems that are associated with foreign-imposed, centralized, top-down approaches.

Economic and Foreign Policy Considerations

For years, visa liberalization with Europe has been considered a top political priority by both populace and politicians of Ukraine. But short-term travel is not the endgame. While such a momentary victory for politicians will provide temporary satisfaction among citizens, the push for visa-free travel will be replaced by a push for access to the European labor market. While complete free trade in labor is unlikely, gradual progress is possible.²⁰ What economic consequences should we expect if the EU did open itself up to Ukrainian labor?

The extensive empirical research on the topic use data from both the United States and Europe and agree that the impact of immigration on native workers’ wages is negative, but small and temporary, and the impact on native employment zero.²¹ An influx of labor migrants to Europe could also be a boon to economic growth. Experts suggest that even partial elimination of barriers to labor mobility would result in substantial increases in productivity and returns to capital.²³ Moving labor from Ukraine where it is relatively unproductive to Europe where that same labor can be more productive boosts GDP. Such migration also decreases the cost of goods and services for the native population (Cortes 2008; Lach 2007).^23, 24

Literature investigating the economic effects of migration on the country of origin is less extensive. Some warn that labor mobility creates a challenge for the EU in avoiding triggering a brain drain that could further weaken the Ukrainian economy.^25, 26 Survey data finds that, indeed, it is more often educated, skilled Ukrainians who leave the country to work. Not only that, but they tend to “downshift,” i.e. work in jobs for which they are overqualified, while abroad, and the remittances they send home are most often utilized for consumption rather than investment.²⁷

Fortunately, we can look to a previous example of the EU opening its borders to labor migration from Eastern Europe. In 2004, when eight formerly communist countries were admitted to the European Union, three members states, the UK, Ireland, and Sweden, immediately opened their labor markets to these countries. In the next three years, 9% of the workforce, mostly young people, from newly-admitted Lithuania immigrated to the UK and Ireland to work. The consequences for the Lithuanian economy were an increase in wages among younger people coinciding with a period of economic growth. This example also shows evidence that the price of labor is an important channel through which supply shocks in the country of origin are absorbed.²⁸ Data from Fiji in the late 1980s and early ‘90s suggest that the responsiveness of the price system has similar effectiveness in nullifying brain drain. As skilled workers emigrate, wages in their professions rise, encouraging investment in human capital.²⁹

As previously mentioned, migration can be a mechanism for the transmission of the values and experiences that make up a populace’s mētis, and therefore an avenue by which new, lasting institutions can form. This applies not only to institutions of political organization and procedures, but also to the formal and informal economic institutions that foster economic development. Poland’s experience with tolerating some private enterprise and enforcing certain private property rights gave the Polish people a mētis proper to a transition to a market economy that would grow at the yearly rate of 5 to 6 percent for the first decade.³⁰ Ukrainian migration to Europe could expose migrants to these ideas and institutions, and introduce familiarity with and demand for a régime of private property rights that could spur economic growth.

Freer movement of people and labor between the EU and Ukraine means Smithian growth for Europe as relatively low-skill migrants allow native labor to be put to more productive uses. A more productive division of labor is achieved. Less restricted movement also would mean Schumpeterian growth for Ukraine as some of the existing values, experiences, and institutions are supplanted by some of the values, experiences, and institutions that make Europe so economically productive.

Short of free labor migration, Guild et al. (2014) suggest opening the EU to Ukrainian business subsidiaries and to artisans and tradesmen, at least temporarily, in order to alleviate the economic turbulence of the crisis in the east.³¹ Indeed, the EU ought not neglect migration policy as an instrument of foreign policy with Russia and the Eastern Partnership countries. These countries and their citizens are torn between two worlds and have in recent decades been of two minds about which way to go. In this period, the EU’s modus operandi has been to offer integration on the condition of policy adoption; meanwhile Russia has attempted to influence by many sticks and few carrots, and without explicitly linking specific acts of noncompliance with specific consequences. The result of this has been an inability of Russia to stymie EU-compliant reform among its neighbors.³² Europe’s incentivizing could play a role in squelching secessionist movements in Ukraine as well as in Moldova and Georgia. Russian support for separatists has of course been partially to discourage gazing westward, but “easier access to the European Union is a great argument for the inhabitants of separatist regions to reconsider their position towards the state.”³³

Conclusions

The European Union’s migration policy with Ukraine, looking beyond visa liberalization for short stays, should not just be considered a potential carrot to encourage Ukrainian elites to implement liberal democratic reforms, but should be recognized as an opportunity to allow Ukrainian society to grow the roots necessary to sustain institutions that foster peace and prosperity. This means not just offering the politically popular visa liberalization as a reward to elites for building good institutions, but understanding the role freer migration can play in solidifying these institutions. There will always be, of course, a need to control irregular migration and potential security threats when travel laws are liberalized, but the Moldovan example shows these are not cause for great concern. Moving forward, the EU should view its migration policy as part of a holistic approach to promoting its goals of peace and development for Ukraine and the other eastern neighbors.

Footnotes

1. Betliy, Oleksandra (2014). “Migration Between the EU, V4 and Eastern Europe: The Present Situation and the Possible Future. The Perspective of Ukraine.” In Marta Jaroszewicz & Magdalena Lesińska (eds.), Forecasting Migration Between the EU, V4 and Eastern Europe: Impact of Visa Abolition. Center for Eastern Studies, 158–180.
2. Jarosziwicz, Marta (2015). “The Migration of Ukrainians in Times of Crisis.” OWS Commentary, no. 187.
3. Betliy, Oleksandra.
4. Jarosziwicz, Marta.
5. Betliy, Oleksandra.
6. Guild, Elspeth, Evelien Brouwer, Kees Groenendijk & Sergio Carrera (2015). “What Is Happening to the Schengen Borders.” CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe, no. 86.
7. Benedyczak, Jakub, Leonid Litra & Krzysztof Mrozek (2015). “Moldova’s Success Story: The Visa-Free Regime with the EU One Year On.” Visa-Free Europe.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Nizhnikau, Ryhor (2015). “Institutional Change in the Eastern Neighbourhood: Environmental Protection and Migration Policy in Ukraine.” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 15(4), 495–517.
11. Aligica, Paul Dragos (2013). Institutional Diversity and Political Economy: The Ostroms and Beyond. New York: Oxford University Press.
12. Nizhnikau, Ryhor.
13. Ibid.
14. Boettke, Peter J., Christopher J. Coyne & Peter T. Leeson (2008). “Institutional Stickiness and the New Development Economics.” American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 67(2), 331–358.
15. Ibid.
16. Barsbai, Toman, Hillel Rapoport, Andreas Steinmayr & Christoph Trebesch (2016). “The Effect of Labor Migration on the Diffusion of Democracy: Evidence from a Former Soviet Republic.” G-MonD Working Paper n44.
17. Batista, Catia & Pedro C. Vicente (2011). “Do Migrants Improve Governance at Home? Evidence from a Voting Experiment.” World Bank Economic Review 25, 77–104.
18. Docquier, Frédéric, Elisabetta Lodigiani, Hillel Rapoport & Maurice Schiff (2016). “Emigration and Democracy.” Journal of Development Economics 120, 209–223.
19. Boettke, Peter J., Christopher J. Coyne & Peter T. Leeson.
20. Merheim-Eyre, Igor (2016). “Europe is Not Enough: or Why Ukraine will Soon Lose Interest in EU Visa-Free Travel.” VoxUkraine.
21. Leeson, Peter T. & Zachary Gochenour. (2015). “The Economic Effects of International Labor Mobility.” In Benjamim Powell (ed.), The Economics of Immigration. New York: Oxford University Press, 11–37.
22. Clemens, Michael (2011). “Economics and Emigration: Trillion-Dollar Bills on the Sidewalk?” The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 25(3), 83–106.
23. Cortes, Patricia (2008). “The Effect of Low‐Skilled Immigration on U.S. Prices: Evidence from CPI Data.” Journal of Political Economy, 116(3), 381–422.
24. Lach, Saul (2007). “Immigration and Prices.” Journal of Political Economy, 115(4), 548–587.
25. Guild, Elspeth, Sergio Carrera & Joanna Parkin (2014). “What Role for Migration Policy in the Ukraine Crisis?” CEPS Commentary.
26. Betliy, Oleksandra.
27. Commander, Simon, Olexandr Niklaychuk & Dmytro Vikhrov (2013). “Migration from Ukraine: Brain or Brawn? New Survey Evidence.” IZA Discussion Paper, no. 7348.
28. Elsner, Benjamin (2013). “Emigration and Wages: The EU Enlargement Experiment.” Journal of International Economics 91(1), 154–163.
29. Chand, Satish & Michael Clemens (2008). “Skilled Emigration and Skill Creation: A Quasi-Experiment.” Center for Global Development Working Paper, no. 152.
30. Boettke, Peter J., Christopher J. Coyne & Peter T. Leeson.
31. Guild, Elspeth, Sergio Carrera & Joanna Parkin.
32. Andemmer, Esther & Laure Delcour (2016). “With a Little Help From Russia? The European Union and Visa Liberalization with Post-Soviet States.” Eurasian Geography and Economics (57)1, 89–112.
33. Benedyczak, Jakub, Leonid Litra & Krzysztof Mrozek.